

# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

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## TIME LAG IN FOREIGN POLICY HITS U. S. ROLE IN CHANGING WORLD

IN one of the most significant passages of his address at the twenty-fifth anniversary luncheon of the Foreign Policy Association on October 16, former Under Secretary of State Welles declared that only a "senile," "puny" or "impotent" nation would seek to avoid formulating its own foreign policies for the post-war period until other powers had expressed their intentions. Implicit in the speech as a whole—and especially in this castigation of American isolationists—was a strong sense of urgency, a feeling that the United States cannot play a worthy part in world affairs if it hesitates to commit itself on fundamental international issues at a time when the military struggle in Europe is moving toward a climax. Mr. Welles' remarks were a warning against being caught in the diplomatic blind alleys of the past, protected largely by policies considered adequate a decade or two ago.

**NATIONAL PROCRASTINATION.** That we are not keeping step with the times in our foreign relations has long been evident. This is indicated strikingly by the dilatoriness of the United States Senate in adopting a resolution in support of cooperation with other nations for the establishment of machinery to preserve the future peace of the world. Such a move could have been made most appropriately a quarter of a century ago after we entered World War I. It would still have been useful in the inter-war years between 1919 and 1939, or after Pearl Harbor—or even last spring when the issue of a resolution first came up in Congressional discussion. At the least, action should have been taken before Secretary of State Hull's arrival in Moscow on October 18 for the three-power conference. Each of these opportunities has been lost, with the probable result that, when something is finally done, little enthusiasm will be aroused either in the United States or abroad. The dominant note at home is likely to be a sense of relief that, after the introduction of the subject, Congress

did not alienate us from the whole world by pigeon-holing the proposal or voting it down. Abroad; friends, neutrals and enemies alike may be more impressed by our slowness in acting than by the content of our declaration. There now appears to be only one remedy for this situation: to revamp the resolution in the Senate so that it takes on a new aspect by dealing more concretely and boldly with current issues.

Two recent developments in our Far Eastern policy also indicate how the lateness of an action may deprive it of much of its significance. On October 6 President Roosevelt sent a message to Congress asking authority, after consultation with President Quezon of the Philippine Commonwealth, "to advance the date . . . and to proclaim the legal independence of the Philippines . . . as soon as feasible." He also urged Congress to make provision for Philippine post-war "physical and economic rehabilitation" and to determine what changes are necessary in existing American laws governing economic relations with the islands to promote their economic security after independence. Less than a week later, on October 11, the President asked Congress to repeal the Chinese exclusion laws and admit Chinese immigrants under the quota system. This, he pointed out, would involve the admission of "only about 100 immigrants a year," but would "correct a historic mistake and silence the distorted Japanese propaganda."

**ACTIONS LONG OVERDUE.** Both proposals were excellent, forward-looking moves in Far Eastern political warfare, but one cannot overlook the time at which they were taken. The message on the Philippines followed by some months Japanese announcements that an "independent" government would be established in the islands and occurred only eight days before October 14, when a Philippine puppet government was actually set up. The juxtaposition of events, suggesting a futile attempt on our

part to get under the Japanese deadline, makes it clear that while the United States long ago demonstrated its intention to grant Philippine independence, we allowed Tokyo to steal a march on us in the field of propaganda. This political setback for the United States rests, of course, largely on the fact that Japan holds the Philippines and we do not.

We have also delayed seriously in acting on Chinese exclusion. The first bill for repeal of our discriminatory laws was introduced in the House of Representatives last February, shortly after Mme. Chiang Kai-shek addressed Congress in joint session. The time for its passage was while she was still in this country, so that Congressional action could have been interpreted in China as a measure of American esteem for her as a representative of the Chinese people. Such a step would have raised our prestige in Chungking, encouraging the liberal groups there and weakening the reactionaries who seek to undermine resistance by dwelling on any shortcomings of American policy. Repeal, even now, will have considerable effect in promoting friendship with China, but action is too greatly overdue to arouse the same enthusiasm as half a year ago.

**FACING THE FUTURE.** What steps can be taken in the field of policy, so that the United States can be abreast or ahead of events, instead of being forced periodically to catch up with the changing world? Many moves might be suggested, but two may be indicative of what is required.

(1) After repealing the law against the exclusion of Chinese, will it not be desirable to apply the quota

system to other peoples of the East? The alternative is to wait a decade or two—perhaps even less—until the people of a new India, Burma or East Indies also demand admission on terms of equality. The effect on the American population would be negligible, since all these groups would receive the minimum quota, but the winning of the war in Asia and the avoidance of future friction would be facilitated.

(2) Far more significant is the point suggested by Mr. Welles and others: that the United States must be prepared to conclude agreements constituting an alliance with its present major partners, Britain, the Soviet Union and China. It is certainly a measure of the backwardness of our policies that, after all the experiences of recent years, it is still not politically expedient, in terms of Congressional sentiment, to introduce an American-British, American-Soviet or American-Chinese treaty for Senate approval. The difficulties do not lie in the legislative branch alone, but the chief bottleneck is undoubtedly to be found there. One can understand the hesitancy of the administration to add to its political difficulties by urging action in advance of indications that Congress is likely to approve. Yet Mr. Welles was not mistaken when he declared that the people of the country look to the President for leadership in the formulation of a foreign policy that will make known "what we believe should be the foundations upon which the world of the future should be constructed, and what we are prepared to contribute to that end, so that this country of ours shall not again be plunged into war."

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

## FACTS DO NOT SUPPORT IMPRESSION CREATED BY ITINERANT SENATORS

The storm which has buffeted Anglo-American relations since the return of the five world-girdling Senators appears to have blown over, but not without leaving some wreckage in its wake. Few observers believe that the military and political ties which have developed between the United States and Britain during the war will be seriously jeopardized. It is probably true, none the less, that a false impression of Anglo-American collaboration has been given the American people as a result of the charges and complaints reportedly made by the Senators during the "secret" sessions of the Senate on October 7 and

8. According to a dispatch in the *New York Times* of October 14, the Senator's reports have aroused anew the skepticism of the Midwest toward both Britain and Russia, and will probably impede the hitherto successful drive to gain support in that region for post-war unity among the Allies. It may be useful, therefore, to establish as far as possible the facts relating to the chief points raised in the Senate.

**OIL, LEND-LEASE AND WAR NEWS.** The charge that the British have been saving their petroleum resources in the Middle East when they might have contributed a larger share to the Allied war effort is hardly borne out by the available evidence. Until the Mediterranean was opened by the conquest of Sicily and the surrender of the Italian fleet, it was impossible to get oil from the Middle East to Britain without sending tankers on the long voyage around the Cape of Good Hope. As a result, Britain received its oil almost entirely from British fields in Trinidad and Venezuela, and from the United States. But an even more important factor in the situation is that by far the largest part of the high-octane gasoline

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used by the Allies—and probably all of the newest type with an octane rating well above 100—has to come from the United States, the only country with refineries to produce it. Since this American product plays a major part in the effectiveness of all Allied air forces, it is understandable why a disproportionately heavy drain has had to be placed on the petroleum resources of this country.

In considering the criticism that the British have handed on lend-lease supplies to third countries without indicating that the goods were of American origin, it should be remembered that the United States has received credit in North Africa for large quantities of material sent from Britain. In the absence of specific evidence, it is probably safe to assume that British authorities have on certain occasions found it strategically desirable to fill their lend-lease program to Russia, for example, with American lend-lease goods, while retaining for their own use British products originally intended for shipment abroad. Certainly there is no reason to believe that exceptions to the normal lend-lease procedure are conducted, over the long run, on anything but a *quid pro quo* basis.

In the case of the complaint that British news agencies specifically identify British victories but speak of American successes as Allied achievements, it can only be assumed that their personnel has succumbed to the human tendency to highlight one's own prowess. But there is evidence of the same tendency in the news agencies of this country, and it would probably be difficult to assess the balance of "guilt" as between the two English-speaking allies.

**WAR-BUILT BASES.** A matter more important than any of the foregoing, however, is the question of bases—particularly airfields—built by the United States in many parts of the world, and to which this country has no post-war rights, except possibly in Latin America. It is clear, of course, that the United States requested permission to build these bases because the high command believed them necessary for successful prosecution of the war, and that the cost involved is not essentially different from expenditures on tanks and airplanes. It is true that since only the movable equipment will be the property of the United States at the close of the war, our Allies will have been enriched by American war construction. In this sense the bases are comparable with some of the capital equipment shipped under lend-lease, and the problem will undoubtedly be considered in any lend-lease settlement.

But no one can expect that sovereignty over these

bases will be given up, or that we will receive commercial or military rights except under certain conditions. As to commercial rights, it is safe to say that roughly 85 per cent of the bases will be of no importance, and that with respect to the rest we will receive rights only in return for similar rights in bases on American territory. On the other hand, we can expect military rights only if we continue the present military collaboration—albeit of a different character in peacetime—with our present Allies. Failing an alliance or military understanding with the sovereign power concerned, the bases would be of no use to the United States in any case, unless this country intends to take them by force or threat of force.

**BRITISH REACTION.** The impression in the United States—perceptibly augmented by the Senators' reports—that British civilian and military officials work as a smooth-running machine and know just what they want from the future has already aroused some amazement, if not amusement, in Britain. In fact, there are the same disagreements and frictions in Britain between the services and between government departments as in the United States. The chief difference is that, as a result of the constitutional system and a more restrained press, the squabbles do not reach the public. It could be expected, of course, that with over a hundred years' experience in conducting the affairs of a world-wide empire and commercial system, the British should have well-informed officials in well-chosen spots throughout the world.

The British press indicates that there has been a good deal of resentment about the whole affair in Britain and that the storm has caused some concern about the future of Anglo-American relations. But the feeling in responsible quarters is that the United States is in process of hammering out a new foreign policy, and that it is better that grievances—even if imaginary—should be aired now while the need for collaboration is compelling, than that they should be nursed until victory is won and the need for unity is no longer so obvious. **HOWARD P. WHIDDEN, JR.**

*Passport to Treason*, by Alan Hynd. New York; McBride, 1943. \$3.00


Exciting, if a bit over-dramatized, story of spies in the United States and the work of the FBI.

*The Origins and Background of the Second World War*, by C. Grove Haines and Ross J. S. Hoffman. New York, Oxford University Press, 1943. \$4.25

Careful attempt to explain the war in relation to the main currents of modern history rather than in terms of mere political events and diplomacy.



# Washington News Letter



OCT. 18.—The most startling development in American public opinion is the appearance of a new trend toward nationalism. Those who support the new nationalism are opposed to the mildest proposals for international political cooperation by the United States, suspect the motives and actions of other nations, and want the United States to play an influential role in world affairs. An opportunity to test the strength of this faction will come in the course of the Senate debate on the foreign policy resolution which Senator Connally introduced on October 14, following its approval by a seven-to-one vote in a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The resolution, now before the full committee, proposes: "That the United States, acting through its constitutional processes, join with free and sovereign nations in the establishment and maintenance of international authority with power to prevent aggression and to preserve the peace of the world."

**MIDWEST INTEREST IN NATIONALISM.** On October 13 Mr. Catledge reported in the *New York Times* that the statements of the five world-traveling Senators had inspired an upsurge of nationalism in the Middle West. This sentiment represents a trend away from isolationism—not toward international collaboration but toward a policy of looking out for "American interests." This trend was expressed in Congress on October 15, when the Senate Appropriations Committee ordered an inquiry, to be made by itself and the Truman Committee, into United States expenditures abroad and in behalf of foreign countries. This decision was brought about by the five Senators' report that lend-lease funds were being misspent in some instances. Senator Hugh R. Butler, Republican of Nebraska, voiced the extreme nationalist view when he told the committee that lend-lease is "the most colossal dole of all time."

While nationalist sentiment is gaining some ground, so is sentiment favoring international collaboration. Mr. Catledge reported that the nationalistic views he found in Omaha were still outweighed by advocacy of international collaboration. The National Opinion Research Center in Denver stated on October 16 that five out of every ten Americans think there is a good chance that a world union will prevent future wars. Nebraska will have a formal opportunity to express itself on the issues of nationalism and internationalism in the Republican Presidential preferential primary next April, for on

October 7 the name of Lt. Commander Harold Stassen, former Governor of Minnesota, was entered in that contest. Before joining the Navy, Stassen urged the establishment of a strong world organization and American participation in a system of international force to keep the peace.

**WILLKIE'S CHALLENGE.** Wendell Willkie, Republican Presidential candidate, in 1940, demonstrated that in Missouri it pays to favor international collaboration. On October 15 he said in St. Louis: "I should like to see this country exercise its utmost qualities of leadership and moral force to bring Great Britain, Russia and China and the United States to a point of understanding where they will make a joint declaration of intention as a preliminary to forming a Council of the United Nations and other friendly nations and eventually of all nations." The *New York Herald Tribune* reported from St. Louis on October 17 that a check of Republican leaders "bore out the contention of Mr. Willkie and his friends that his address and meetings had strengthened his hand" in Missouri, where the Republican organization had been opposing him.

Advocates of international collaboration were active in the Senate as well as out of it. A day after Senator Connally, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, introduced his foreign policy resolution, eleven other Senators—Republicans and Democrats—announced they would seek adoption on the Senate floor of a strong amendment calling for this country's participation in "an organization to promote cooperation among nations, with authority to settle international disputes peacefully and with power, including military force." The *Washington Post* reported that these words reflect Connally's wishes better than the resolution approved by the subcommittee, which overrode him when he proposed that the resolution include the words "an international agency" instead of the vague "international authority," and that it call for the use of "economic, military and naval sanctions" to keep the peace.

The lines are drawn for a sharp and penetrating Senate debate. The resolution, even in its present mild form, is a challenge to the nationalists because it approves of some sort of cooperation. It is possible, however, that nationalist sentiment will have some influence on the resolution the Senate finally passes. Testimony unfriendly to our Allies which, it is expected, will be presented to Senatorial investigators of the lend-lease program undoubtedly will strengthen the nationalist arguments. **BLAIR BOLLES**

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